Heavenly Procreation

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ABSTRACT: Kenneth Einar Himma (2009, 2016) argues that the existence of Hell renders procreation impermissible. Jason Marsh (2015) contends that problems of evil motivate anti-natalism. Anti-natalism is principally rejected for its perceived conflict with reproductive rights. I propose a theistic solution to the latter problem. Universalism says that all persons will, postmortem, eventually be eternally housed in Heaven, a superbly good place wherein harm is fully absent. The acceptance of universalism is now widespread, but I offer further reason to embrace one variant of it. If universalism is true and there are opportunities to procreate in Heaven, then reproductive autonomy is largely preserved for everyone. Assuming Heaven is a harm-free place, there are no risks to children born in Heaven, unlike Earth or Hell. While this requires human persons to accept temporary restrictions on procreation during our premortem lives, the bulk of reproductive autonomy is preserved since one will have infinite opportunities to reproduce in Heaven.

1. Introduction

What should philosophers of religion, and theists in particular, say about procreation ethics? When, if ever, is intentional procreation morally permissible? Before looking at what theists have said, I’ll introduce two families of views in the literature that answer the latter question:

PRO-NATALISM
   Human procreation is often all-things-considered morally permissible.

ANTI-NATALISM
   Human procreation is never all-things-considered morally permissible.

Not surprisingly, most people—and indeed most philosophers—are pro-natalists, rejecting anti-natalism as a radical and esoteric view. After all, most people believe their lives are good for them on the whole and thus view existence as a net benefit. But as David Benatar cautions, we should carefully distinguish between lives worth starting and lives worth continuing (Benatar & Wasserman 2015: 18). Anti-natalists don’t, or at least need not, dispute that many of our lives are worth continuing. What they deny is the permissibility of

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1 My thanks to Anthony Ferrucci and Jason Marsh for helpful discussion. Thanks also to Kenneth Einar Himma for stoking my curiosity about this topic, and to both the editor (Tom Senor) and two anonymous reviewers for comments on two prior drafts.

2 Hereafter when referring to procreation, I assume procreation of the kind for which we can in principle hold humans morally responsible. Thus, I exclude from consideration cases of accidental procreation.

3 Indeed, theists have antecedent reason to reject some arguments for anti-natalism, such as Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument, as most theists believe human existence is itself good. Although see Matthew 26:24 where Jesus says of Judas, “It would be better for him if he had not been born.”
creating new life where harm to it will almost inevitably follow. The arsenal of powerful arguments favoring anti-natalism should halt, or at least slow, a kneejerk rejection of it. As an example, consider Jimmy Alfonso Licon’s consent-based argument for anti-natalism:

1. An individual is justified in subjecting someone to potential harm only if either:
   (a) they provide informed consent, (b) such is in their best interests, or (c) they deserve to be subjected to potential harm.
2. Bringing someone into existence is potentially subjecting them to harm.
3. Individuals that do not exist: (a) cannot give their consent to being brought into existence, (b) do not have interests to protect, and (c) do not deserve anything.
4. Hence, procreation is not morally justified. (Licon 2012: 88)

Licon’s first premise restates a principle of permissible risk commonly invoked in bioethics. The second premise isn’t in any doubt. In the third premise, point (a) is transparently true of actual consent but less clearly true about other forms of consent, such as hypothetical consent. However, there are well-known problems with hypothetical consent as a substitute for actual consent (Singh 2018; Licon 2012: 89-90). Points (b) and (c) are also quite plausible, the biggest hiccup being that since the lives of most people are very good for them, it’s in their interests to come into existence. However, this overlooks the asymmetry between extant and merely possible persons: It’s permissible to subject people to potential harm to avoid worse harms, but not to provide mere benefits (Shiffrin 1999). For example, consider the difference between injecting an unconscious person with morphine because they would otherwise awake to terrible pain versus injecting them to make them slightly happier. The former but not the latter is permissible, and the difference lies in what the exposure accomplishes.

Here’s another argument for anti-natalism developed by David Benatar, the Misanthropic Argument:

1. We have a (presumptive) duty to desist from bringing into existence new members of species that cause (and will likely continue to cause) vast amounts of pain, suffering, and death.
2. Humans cause vast amounts of pain, suffering, and death.
3. Therefore, we have a (presumptive) duty to desist from bringing new humans into existence. (Benatar & Wasserman 2015: 79)

Imagine a species like coronavirus-19, which as of writing has killed nearly two million people worldwide. Were it in our power, we ought to prevent the replication of coronavirus-19 because it causes vast amounts of pain, suffering, and death. Of course, humans are different because they have moral status: they are sentient, made in God’s image, rights-bearers, and the like. But unless there is an obligation to create new humans, the presumption against creating new humans—who will cause vast amounts of pain, suffering, and death—remains intact. Merely wanting new humans around seems paltry justification for allowing the harms that follow. Nor do harms to final generations appear to justify procreation: Life will be bad for the final generation of humans, yes, but that suffering pales in comparison to the total suffering of all future generations if procreation persists.
These arguments offer merely a sampling of anti-natalist arguments. Other arguments range from preventing global poverty (Benatar 2020) to curbing carbon emissions (Burkett Forthcoming; Torpman 2021; Hedberg 2019) to self-care (Harrison & Tanner 2011: 119-120). Even if these arguments prove unsuccessful, they merit close scrutiny. But why think they merit close scrutiny from philosophers of religion or from theists? This brings us to a review of what philosophers of religion and theists have, in fact, said about the issue. In a 2015 paper, Jason Marsh developed an argument that puts pressure on pro-natalist atheists who take the problem of evil seriously:

The premises of many evidential arguments from evil, if endorsed, may challenge the existence of a perfect God or even a minimally decent creator. But these premises equally appear to challenge the value of many human lives and by extension many acts of human procreation. If we convey, whether explicitly or implicitly, that the world risks being bad or far less good then we make procreation risky in general. If we communicate, less strongly, that the value of many but not nearly all lives is negative or ambiguous, we still raise important local challenges to procreation, according to which many shouldn’t procreate. (Marsh 2015: 73)

Were the horrors of this world to impugn the permissibility of divine creation, one struggles to say precisely how it wouldn’t also impugn the permissibility of human procreation. If successful, Marsh’s argument forces those persuaded by problems of evil to explain their simultaneous pro-natalist stance. Vince Vitale (2017) turns Marsh’s modus tollens into a modus ponens, contending that the apparent permissibility of human procreation supports the permissibility of divine creation. And William Hasker draws an explicit parallel between God’s choice to create libertarian-free creatures and a parent’s choice to do the same:

As a start on answering the question, I am going to ask my readers to join me in a thought experiment. Imagine yourself, then, as a prospective parent shortly before the birth of your first child. And suppose that someone has offered you the following choice: On the one hand, the child will be one who, without any effort on your part, will always and automatically do and be exactly what you want it to do and be, no more and no less. ... Or on the other hand, you can choose to have a child in the normal fashion, a child that is fully capable of having a will of its own and of resisting your wishes for it, and even if acting against its own best interest. (Hasker 2020: 321)

Hasker then expresses his hope that readers will agree with him that “it is far better to accept the challenge of parenting a child with a will of its own, even at the price of pain and possible heartbreak” (2020: 231). By contrast, Thomas Flint wholly disagrees:

Where others are involved, especially others to whom we have some special relationship, we are especially concerned to lessen or eliminate the risks our actions may posed to them. For example, it is arguably immoral for a father to drive without wearing his seat belt. But it seems clearly worse for him to drive and not provide a proper child-restraint seat for his two-year-old daughter. If he could completely

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eliminate the risks which driving poses for her, surely he would do it in an instant. Openist cries of “How dull!”; “Take a chance!”; “Live a little!” and the like would presumably have minimal effect. (Flint 1998: 105)

When, years ago as a graduate student, I expressed support for Flint’s anti-risk argument against open theism, my Hasker-sympathizing colleague countered that the anti-risk argument would make procreation impermissible. Whereas he viewed this as a reductio of the anti-risk argument, I regarded it as a reductio of pro-natalism. It takes little imagination to see how the problem of evil might itself serve as an argument for anti-natalism:

The Argument from Evil for Anti-Natalism
1. It is morally impermissible for God to create sentient beings in a universe that contains this much evil and suffering.
2. If (1), then it is morally impermissible for human beings to procreate in the same universe.
3. Therefore, it is morally impermissible for human beings to procreate in the same universe.

Theists will, of course, reject (1). However, given that theists should and do take (1) seriously, they must also take (2) seriously. So, they must take anti-natalism seriously. The same holds for philosophers of religion, theists or not, who take (1) seriously. A final, fourth argument for anti-natalism can be generated from the problem of hell, which Marilyn McCord Adams understands as the view that “[s]ome created persons will be consigned to hell forever” (1993: 302). Adams formulates the problem of hell thusly:

The Problem of Hell
1. If God existed and were omnipotent, He would be able to avoid [Hell].
2. If God existed and were omniscient, He would know how to avoid [Hell].
3. If God existed and were perfectly good, He would want to avoid [Hell].
4. Therefore, if [God exists and is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good], not (Hell). (Adams 1993: 302-303)

Adams escapes the problem of hell by endorsing universalism. However, for theists who prefer to keep their hell and solve the problem, too, they encounter another problem. Kenneth Einar Himma (2010, 2016) contends that those who endorse the existence of Hell, salvific exclusivism, and pro-natalism are inconsistent. The reason being what Himma calls the New Life Principle, or NLP:

NEW LIFE PRINCIPLE:

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5 Hasker, it should be noted, rejects Flint’s analogy and its implications for open theism.
6 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer at Faith and Philosophy for rephrasing this argument as an argument not against Hell simpliciter, but against the conjunction of Hell and salvific exclusivism. However, I wish to note my sympathy for an argument against Hell simpliciter: that if Hell exists at all, then even a minuscule risk of Hell (say, under salvific inclusivism or pluralism) is too much risk, thus rendering procreation impermissible.
It is wrong for would-be parents to bring a child into the world if they rationally believe there is a sufficiently high probability that the child will experience severe harm after birth that will endure throughout the child’s lifetime. (Himma 2016: 94)

The severe, enduring harm to which Himma alludes is Hell, which he conceives as “a state of eternal torment unmatched in severity by anything one can experience in this world” (2016: 94). For those who accept Hell’s existence and admit a non-trivial risk of ending up there, Himma’s argument puts pressure on many pro-natalist theists:

The Argument from Hell for Anti-Natalism

1. It is wrong for would-be parents to bring a child into the world if they rationally believe there is a sufficiently high probability that the child will experience severe harm after birth that will endure throughout the child’s lifetime.

2. Would-be parents who accept the conjunction of Hell and salvific exclusivism are rationally committed to believing there is a sufficiently high probability that their children will experience harm after birth that will endure throughout their children’s lifetimes.

3. So, it is wrong for would-be parents who accept the conjunction of Hell and salvific exclusivism to bring children into the world.

Minimally, theists described in (2) should take the problem of hell seriously. But if God’s creation of humans is potentially impugned by the existence of Hell, so too is human procreation. So, they should also take anti-natalism seriously.

A confident universalist and anti-natalist, I am unbothered by Himma’s argument. But I remain torn by the apparent conflict between my principled anti-natalism, on the one hand, and my adamant commitment to deontological views about autonomy, particularly procreative autonomy, on the other. The most widely cited challenge to anti-natalism is procreative autonomy, understood as the moral right to reproduce or refrain from reproducing. It has been said that anti-natalists cannot accept a moral right to reproduce (Robertson 1994: 24). Call this the Autonomy Objection to anti-natalism. In my view, anti-natalists can successfully rebuff the Autonomy Objection. For instance, anti-natalists maintain only that procreation is impermissible, but that is consistent with a view on which it’s possible to have a moral right to act impermissibly (Herstein 2012).

What I propose to accomplish in this essay is to motivate a theistic response to the Autonomy Objection that adds to the replies available to anti-natalists, albeit ones who are also theists. As the prior four arguments for anti-natalism suggest, theists have powerful reason to take anti-natalism seriously. They also have powerful reason to take procreative autonomy seriously, particularly if they are pro-natalists. But if they take both seriously, we share a common project: theists eager to avoid the problems of evil and hell while maintaining a plausible view of procreation. My argument runs as follows. The theistic doctrine of universalism says that all persons will, postmortem, eventually be eternally housed in Heaven, a superbly good place wherein harm is fully absent. If we further suppose that there will be endless opportunities to procreate in Heaven, then reproductive autonomy

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7 Recent challenges (e.g., Bolinger, “Revisiting the Right to Do Wrong”) to this move have lessened my confidence, however.
is largely maintained for all persons. Assuming Heaven is a harm-free place, there are no risks to children born in Heaven, unlike Earth (or Hell). Under these assumptions, the Autonomy Objection lacks teeth or at least has more gaps. In Section 2, I explore variants of the Autonomy Objection and conclude that the strongest interpretation is an objection to *loss of opportunity*. In Section 3, I consider arguments for the possibility of heavenly procreation and conclude that our best evidence supports its possibility. In Section 4, I demonstrate how this possibility undermines the Autonomy Objection. Let’s call the resultant potent combination of anti-natalism and theistic universalism *Anti-Natal Universalism*, or ‘ANU’. If successful, ANU escapes the problem of hell and the Autonomy Objection and somewhat weakening the impact of the problem of evil, leaving theism more plausible than we found it—and decidedly anti-natalist.

2. The Autonomy Objection

Autonomy is central to procreative ethics, with most supporting a strong *pro tanto* right to reproduction (Meijers 2020; Silvers & Francis 2019; Robertson 1994). A right to procreative autonomy is typically derived from a more general right to control one’s body (Overall 2012: 21) or a right to pursue one’s life projects (Brake 2016; Quigley 2010), both of which are weighty.

However, this right is not unmitigated. Most pro-natalists admit that procreation is sometimes impermissible (Conly 2005). Allen Buchanan *et al* (2002: 249) say procreation is impermissible when and because the child will experience “serious suffering or limited opportunity or serious loss of happiness or good.” Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane (2009: 274) defend an obligation to create the child “whose life can be expected, in light of the relevant available evidence, to go best.” David Wasserman (2015: 229) says procreation is permissible only if parents create children they couldn’t reasonably expect to “meet a minimum standard of well-being.” Rivka Weinberg (2016: 176, 179) claims procreation is permissible only if motivated by “the desire and intention to raise, love, and nurture one’s child once it is born” and when “the risk you impose as a procreator on your children would not be irrational for you to accept as a condition of your own birth.” And Tommie Shelby (2016: 132) endorses a principle prohibiting procreation in cases where the parent will “very likely be unable to fulfill responsibilities she would incur through procreating.”

The problem with anti-natalism is that it requires us *always*, and not merely sometimes, to refrain from procreating (Benatar 2013: 102-113). Even for positions that fall short of this, such as Sarah Conly’s (2016) view that each person is permitted only one child, procreative autonomy is severely curtailed. Thus, under strong and mitigated anti-natalist views, there are few to no opportunities to procreate permissibly. Assuming a strong *pro tanto* right to procreate, we have the following argument against anti-natalism:

*The Autonomy Argument*

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8 I shall interpret claims of the form “S isn’t morally permitted to procreate at time t” to imply “S lacks a right to procreate at t.” That is, I shall interpret deontic restrictions as rights restrictions. Those who reject this must explain how the Autonomy Objection is incompatible with anti-natalism, which typically maintains only that procreation is impermissible.
1. Persons have a strong pro tanto right to procreate.\(^9\)
2. If (1), then procreation is generally permissible.
3. If anti-natalism is true, then procreation is not generally permissible.
4. Therefore, anti-natalism is false.

Again, the problem isn’t that we can’t justify some limitations on procreation. Few disagree that procreation is impermissible if the parent has severe radiation poisoning. Rather, it’s that we can’t justify this much of a limitation. Almost every potential child will experience some suffering, leave a carbon footprint, be exposed to serious harms, and cannot consent prior to being created. Thus, the harms to which anti-natalists appeal to ground the general wrongness of procreation aren’t going anywhere soon.\(^10\) Indeed, Jesus himself warns that the poor will forever be with us (Matthew 26:11), a concern not unnoticed by Benatar (2020).

For the duration of this paper, I shall argue as if the Autonomy Objection is the only serious objection to anti-natalism.\(^11\) In particular, I shall assume that procreative autonomy is the only moral consideration blocking a general obligation not to procreate. Thus, I ask readers to assume that anti-natalism would be true if the Autonomy Objection is successfully defeated. It’s to defeating it that I now turn.

3. The Possibility of Heavenly Procreation

Before exploring arguments for the possibility of procreation in Heaven, I shall consider arguments against it. This is something of a challenge as there are few arguments in the literature against heavenly procreation. Fortunately, we can fill the gaps with some imagination. I consider three arguments: the No Sex in Heaven Argument, the No Freedom Argument, and the Unfairness Argument.

The Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke portray Heaven as a place without marriage or sex. For instance, Matthew (22:30) claims that “in the resurrection, they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as angels in heaven,” with Mark (12:25) and Luke (20:27-39) making identical claims. For this to be an argument against the possibility of procreation, however, we must assume procreation and sex occur permissibly only within marriage. That gives us this:

\(^9\) An anonymous reviewer asks why traditional theists should accept this premise, as many traditional theists could rather say that (only) married couples (or, more narrowly still, married couples made up of one man and one woman) have a strong pro tanto right to procreate. My personal recommendation would be that traditional theists surrender these heterosexist views of marriage and adopt more a more inclusive view. However, for traditional theists not inclined to surrender, premise (1) can be revised as follows: (1*) Monogamous, heterosexual couples have a strong pro tanto right to procreate. Given that many people are married and that most marriages are monogamous and heterosexual, the right to procreative autonomy would still be undercut for millions (if not billions) of people.

\(^10\) We could instead call this the Opportunity Argument as it centers on opportunities to exercise one’s procreative autonomy and not the autonomy itself. However, limiting the number of reasonable opportunities to exercise one’s autonomy limits one’s autonomy.

\(^11\) There are other important objections to anti-natalism. For a sampling, see Sullivan-Bissett & McGregor, “Better No Longer to Be”; McMahan, “Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives”; and McLean, “What’s So Good About Non-Existence?”
The No Sex in Heaven Argument

1. There are no marriages in Heaven.
2. There is no moral wrongdoing in Heaven.
3. It is morally wrong to have extramarital sex.
4. Human procreation is (exclusively) sexual.
5. Therefore, there is no human procreation in Heaven.

But this argument is bad, as I’ll now explain. First, premise (4) is flatly false. Most cases of assisted human procreation, like in vitro fertilization (IVF), are asexual. So, asexual heavenly reproduction isn’t ruled out. So, nor is heavenly reproduction simpliciter. Second, premise (1) implies that all premortem marriages are dissolved in Heaven, entailing something like either universal divorce or universal annulment. As neither divorce nor annulment square with biblical admonitions about the permanence of marriage, the possibility of marriages that endure in Heaven is preferable. Third, the conservative sexual ethics of (3) is highly contentious. I lack space to argue against it here, however, and will instead end by noting that both theological conservatives and progressives have reason to reject the No Sex in Heaven Argument.

The second argument concerns freedom in Heaven. The much-discussed problem of heavenly freedom runs thusly: Heaven is a place where sin is impossible, libertarian freedom requires the ability to do otherwise, and thus humans in Heaven lack libertarian freedom. A similar argument can be made against procreation:

The No Freedom Argument

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12 This argument, while scarcely mentioned in the philosophical literature, remains a staple of lay theology. For that reason, it’s worth addressing.

13 An anonymous reviewer objects that because in vitro fertilization is condemned by some theists, including in Pope Paul VI’s *Humanae Vitae* (n.12), the permissibility of asexual reproduction remains unproven. Thus, so too does the possibility of heavenly asexual reproduction. While limitations of space prevent me from offering a fuller reply, I will offer a brief reply. Catholic objections to IVF tend to center around at least one of the following: removing conception from the marital act or destroying human embryos. However, the latter need not occur in a heavenly context; embryos need not be destroyed to facilitate reproduction. As for the former, even Catholics accept that asexual reproduction is sometimes caused by God, as in the cases of Hannah (mother of the prophet Samuel), Sarah (mother of Isaac), Elizabeth (mother of John the Baptist), and Mary (mother of Jesus). Thus, removing conception from the marital act is not necessarily impermissible, as God (who never acts impermissibly) sometimes removes conception from the marital act.

14 I recognize that most partners have the further interest of procreating with their chosen partner, and that asexual reproduction (sometimes) fails to satisfy that interest. Still, one could premises 1-3 and defuse the Autonomy Objection by allowing for asexual heavenly procreation.

15 An anonymous reviewer objects that I have misinterpreted the biblical passages. They argue that if my interpretation were correct and marriages weren’t dissolved at death, then the woman in the Sadducees’ story would have been both an adulteress and a bigamist, contrary to what Jesus claimed. But if you think persons never die (even if their bodies do), then marriages never dissolve. Of course, one might complain I’m missing the point: Biological death occurs and marriages end with it, according to ancient Jewish and Christian teachings. However, ancient Jewish and Christian teachings, especially those of the Sadducees (Elledge, “Critical Issues in Death and the Afterlife in Ancient Judaism,” 11), frequently denied life after biological death (Fu & Wang, “The Idea of Immortal Life After Death in Biblical Judaism and Confucianism”), so we could just as easily interpret ancient Jewish and Christian teachings as making false assumptions about human mortality and the afterlife.
1. Persons created in Heaven never have the possibility of sinning.
2. If (1), then persons created in Heaven lack libertarian freedom.
3. It is bad, other things being equal, for there to be persons who never had libertarian freedom.
4. Therefore, other things being equal, there will be no persons created in Heaven.

The literature has plenty of responses to the problem of heavenly freedom for persons who existed prior to entering Heaven. For example, Timpe & Pawl (2009) argue that heavenly persons can do otherwise because they can choose which permissible actions they perform, and thus no particular right action is metaphysically necessary for them. More recently, Hartman (2021) explores two models of character perfection in Heaven: a unilateral model where God alone completes the perfection and a cooperative model where God and the person perfect their character. Hartman argues that while both models are compatible with libertarian freedom, the cooperative model allows for more freedom. We can adapt Hartman’s argument to persons created in Heaven who, being incapable of sinning from the start, never have a chance to perfect their characters. Rather, they arrive perfected. If enhanced freedom equips God with good reason to choose the cooperative model over the unilateral one, it also does so with respect to allowing the creation of new persons in Heaven.

Despite being superior to the first argument, the No Freedom Argument fails. First, it cuts equally well against humans who died in utero, in infancy, or at any time prior to the development of their moral agency. So, if the argument provides good reason to exclude heavenly procreation, it also provides reason to exclude fetuses, infants, and others who died. Second, it presumes the impossibility of heavenly escape. But if libertarian freedom is sufficiently valuable, then allowing for the possibility of reincarnation (Goldschmidt & Seacord 2013; Di Muzio 2013) or sinning in Heaven (Matheson 2018; Kent 2017) seems appropriate. Third, it assumes that coming into existence without agency is less preferable than coming into existence with agency. It’s one thing to assume it’s preferable to avoid removing someone’s freedom, but quite another to assume a preference for avoid creating beings without freedom (or, more narrowly, humans without freedom). The former disallows for the presence of nonhuman animals in Heaven (Graves, Hereth, & John 2017) and the latter excludes cognitively disabled humans (Timpe 2020; Cobb & Timpe 2017).

A third and final argument concerns the unfairness of procreation in Heaven. Humans who led extensive premortem lives experienced suffering, death, struggle, and loss. But for those whose existence begins in Heaven, their lives are free from suffering, death, struggle, and loss. They are, in short, lucky, and that luckiness is unfair.16 We can call this, predictably, the Unfairness Argument and construct it as follows:

The Unfairness Argument

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16 For example, Murray, “Three Versions of Universalism,” argues that universalism undermines the importance of earthly life, making the evils of earthly life harder to justify. It’s not hard to see how heavenly procreation might do the same: If exclusively heavenly lives are worth living, why force anyone to endure hellish earthly lives?
1. It's *pro tanto* unfair for some persons to have the opportunity to escape suffering, death, struggle, and loss while others don't have that opportunity through no fault of their own.

2. If heavenly procreation is possible, those whose existences begin in Heaven would never experience suffering, death, struggle, and loss and would exist alongside other persons who lacked that opportunity through no fault of their own.

3. Therefore, if heavenly procreation is possible, there is *pro tanto* unfairness.

Constructed this way, the argument mentions only a *pro tanto* unfairness. But let's grant for argument's sake that there's no justification for the disparity, and thus that the resulting inequality is *all-things-considered* unfair. Even granting this, the argument fails. First, if successful, the argument works not just as an argument against heavenly procreation, but also the admission of human fetuses and infants who, owing to nonidentity worries, did not die 'prematurely' since their time of death was essential to them (Weinberg 2014). Second, the argument implies that God's existence is all-things-considered unfair since God possessed opportunities to avoid suffering whereas humans didn’t. Third, the argument ignores the fact that God is *pro tanto* obligated to grant opportunities to persons to escape suffering, death, and the like. If true, it's not God's *allowing heavenly procreation* that requires justification, but rather *allowing earthly suffering*.

Having rejected these arguments, we can now consider several arguments for the possibility of heavenly procreation. The first is the Be Fruitful Argument. Like the No Sex in Heaven Argument, it's a biblical argument. In *Genesis* (1:28), God commands Eve and Adam to "be fruitful and multiply." Notably, that command was issued prior to the Fall of humankind when all was perfect in Eden. One natural interpretation of this passage is that God, as Creator, desired for humankind to procreate in (though perhaps not *only* in) ideal conditions. Thus, we have our first argument:

*The Be Fruitful Argument*

1. God commands that humankind procreate under 'Edenic' conditions.
2. Procreating in Heaven would occur under 'Edenic' conditions.
3. Therefore, God commands that humankind procreate in Heaven.

The major worry with this argument is that it proves too much, entailing that heavenly procreation must happen because it's obligatory. It's unsurprising, then, that Catholics embrace this command for married couples:

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17 An anonymous reviewer objects that Heaven isn't analogous to Eden, as the latter is a life shot through with corruption. However, as far as consistency with biblical texts are concerned, this is false: Eden was initially uncorrupted, including when Adam and Eve were encouraged to "be fruitful and multiply." There was no death, no suffering, and no corruption.

18 An anonymous reviewer objects that this isn't the most natural reading of the passage. However, two considerations weigh jointly in favor of my interpretation. First, the biblical admonition to "be fruitful and multiply" is frequently invoked in Christian (and particularly Catholic) circles, such that they view procreation as generally obligatory for married couples. Second, most Christians accept that procreation is sometimes impermissible. The simplest way to square these facts is to think that procreation is obligatory (at least for married couples) under good conditions, including Edenic conditions.
By its very nature the institution of marriage and married love is ordered to the procreation and education of the offspring and it is in them that it finds its crowning glory. (*Catechism of the Catholic Church* 1995: 1652)

Despite some defenses of the view that procreation is obligatory (Gheaus 2016), we should reject this view. Minimally, those who accept the Autonomy Objection should reject it, as an obligation to procreate is as much a threat to procreative autonomy as an obligation not to procreate.\(^\text{19}\) So, we should reject this argument in the current context since it’s useless both to anti-natalists and those endorsing the Autonomy Objection.

Next is David Worsley’s (2019) fascinating argument for the possibility of procreation in Limbo. While not yet an argument for heavenly procreation, Worsley’s argument can be adapted to argue for it. To begin, Worsley speculates that Christ’s possession of the fullness of human experience entails Christ’s existence in Limbo, which in turn requires the possibility of procreation in Limbo. He writes,

> How might God become incarnate in limbo? Well, if part of the rationale for Christ’s birth includes his exemplary growth in wisdom and stature, and his assuming all aspects of human life, plausibly, this same rationale will also apply in limbo. That is to say, if Christ’s birth was an essential aspect of his earthly incarnation, if the second person of the Trinity is to become incarnate in limbo, procreation must be possible in limbo, too. (Worsley 2019: 355)

Christ’s assuming *all* aspects of human life entails existence in Limbo, existence in Limbo (which is restricted to infants and young children) requires *coming into existence* in Limbo, and coming into existence in Limbo for God (who exists necessarily) requires becoming incarnate in Limbo. On that basis, Worsley further infers the possibility of “unending iterations of limbo, with the inhabitants of each iteration of limbo departing for either Heaven” or another afterlife locale (2019: 355). He then says the following:

> If my participation in the life of heaven extensively increases the joy of those who died generations before I was born, I see no reason why those joining the heavenly cohort from some later iteration of limbo might not also have the same effect on my extensive enjoyment in heaven. Plausibly, then, if unending iterations of limbo lead to an unending growth in the number of saints in heaven, the joy of each saint will likewise unendingly grow in extent in a way not possible if the number of saints in heaven was fixed. (Worsley 2019: 357)

Worsley, following Thomas Aquinas (Brown 2009: 240), is clear that while the *intensity* of any heavenly person’s joy remains constant, their joy can nevertheless grow *extensively* as

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\(^{19}\) In response to this, an anonymous reviewer has replied that most Christian traditions have claimed that even in an Edenic state, selective celibacy would hold value as a sign of the coming Kingdom of Heaven. But if true, still requires *most* humans to marry and procreate, and thus the Autonomy Objection’s threat remains for such a view.
more saints experience the Beatific Vision (Worsley 2019: 357). In my view, Worsley has two arguments. I’ll treat them separately. Here’s the first:

**The Fittingness Argument**

1. Christ’s incarnation-by-birth was fitting for human redemption on Earth.
2. If (1), then Christ’s incarnation-by-birth would be fitting for human redemption in Limbo.
3. If Christ’s incarnation-by-birth would be fitting for human redemption in Limbo, then procreation would be fitting in Limbo.
4. Therefore, procreation would be fitting in Limbo.

Much depends on how we understand the relationship between human redemption and perfection. One plausible view is that redemption is eliminative: It removes our sin, shame, and guilt and rescues us from their consequences. Perfection, by contrast, is enhancing: It transforms us from good to great, from better to best. And perfection continues well into heavenly life as God transforms us into saints of the highest calling. Some of us might become especially patient whereas others might become especially generous. If Christ’s incarnation-by-birth was fitting to move us from sinner to saint, it seems fitting for another incarnation-by-birth to move us from one saintly stage to the next. Still, this argument doesn’t get us to the possibility of humans procreating with each other, so I’ll move on to Worsley’s second argument:

**The Extensive Joy Argument**

1. The joy of each heavenly saint will grow extensively as more persons come to enjoy the Beatific Vision.
2. If (1), then God has reason to permit heavenly procreation.
3. Therefore, God has reason to permit heavenly procreation.

According to Worsley, more is merrier for Heaven’s saints. So, God has reason to allow for the possibility of more saints. So, God has reason to allow for the possibility of heavenly procreation. While having a reason doesn’t entail acting on it, a perfectly rational being like God would presumably be responsive to reasons. So, in the absence of countervailing or competing reasons, God will allow for the possibility of heavenly procreation.

Finally, we can consider a recent argument by Blake Hereth, who defends the possibility of procreation for trans persons in Heaven. Hereth begins with a defense of trans embodiment in the afterlife and identifies interests their afterlife embodiments will allow them to satisfy. Among these is an opportunity to procreate as their identity-corresponding embodied selves:

Some trans persons, due to their pre-transitional embodiment, were unable to do various things they may have desire to do. For example, some trans women desire to carry children but are unable to do so. Others desire to pursue romantic relationships

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20 This is Brown’s interpretation of Aquinas, which I am happy to accept.
21 Here I assume heavenly virtue needn’t entail maximal virtue. That is, I assume some might be more virtuous than others relative to certain virtues even if everyone lacks vices.
with persons in the body of their choice but were not afforded a reasonable opportunity to transition. Still other trans persons were in romantic relationships during their earthly lives, but their partnerships ended as a result of their trans identities being revealed. These are harms. Because [God] permits them, they are pro tanto injustices. (Hereth 2020: 199)

For Hereth, the opportunity for trans women to procreate as embodied women is an issue of justice. Thus, it’s an opportunity that God ought not to deny trans women. God, as chief architect of the afterlife, is thus subject to an interference-right held by trans women.22 A similar arguments can be applied to trans men, so I’ll reconstruct Hereth’s argument like so:

**The Trans Embodiment Argument**

1. Justice requires that trans persons have opportunities to procreate in Heaven.
2. If (1), then trans persons will have opportunities to procreate in Heaven.
3. Therefore, trans persons will have opportunities to procreate in Heaven.

Hereth’s argument provides grounds for accepting the possibility of heavenly procreation for some persons, but not all of them. So, Hereth’s argument must be modified to show the general possibility of heavenly procreation. Fortunately, it’s easy to see how a revised argument would run.

To start, notice Hereth’s description of trans persons not receiving a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to transition in their earthly lives. It’s uncontroversial to cry foul when trans persons are denied a reasonable opportunity to transition, but what about merely not receiving one (Murphy 2015)? Hereth’s language suggests we should view even the latter as injustices since they are harms permitted by God. It does seem unjust when some persons have fewer opportunities than others through no fault of their own (Kollar & Loi 2015; Casal & Williams 1995). For instance, it seems unjust that some persons are infertile while others can reproduce with ease or that some are born with cancer and others healthy (Maung 2019; Kukla 2019; Padela & Clayville 2018), and it seems unjust that many women and other gestators feel forced to blame themselves for infertility (McLeod & Ponesse 2008). Plausibly, we can also say that persons with a moral obligation M to refrain from procreating at time t lack a reasonable opportunity to procreate at t given M, as ‘opportunities’ that require violating one’s moral obligations are not reasonable ones. If we grant the anti-natalist a general moral obligation not to procreate, then everyday ‘opportunities’ to procreate are not reasonable opportunities. So, all human persons lack reasonable opportunities to procreate. Further granting the first premise of the Autonomy Argument—i.e., that persons have a strong pro tanto right to procreate—it follows that persons should be afforded reasonable opportunities to exercise their right. That gives us a modified argument for the possibility of heavenly procreation, which I shall call the **Undercutting Argument** because moral obligations undercut reasonable opportunities:

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22 The claim is not that persons have a right to experience every human good at some point in their (earthly) lives. Rather, it’s that persons have a pro tanto right against procreative interference (whether asexually or with one another) and that agents limiting those opportunities (as God would be if Heaven prevented procreation) must justify imposing those limits.
The Undercutting Argument

1. Human persons are morally obligated not to procreate premortem.
2. If $S$ is morally obligated not to $Y$ at time $t$, then $S$ lacks a reasonable opportunity to $Y$ at $t$.
3. Therefore, human persons lack a reasonable opportunity to procreate premortem.
4. Human persons have a strong pro tanto right to procreate.
5. If (4), then human persons should have a reasonable opportunity to procreate.
6. If (3) and (5), then human persons should have a reasonable opportunity to procreate postmortem.
7. Therefore, human persons should have a reasonable opportunity to procreate postmortem.

One additional convenience about the Undercutting Argument for the anti-natalist is that, given (1), its motivation is largely internal to anti-natalism. Of course, some anti-natalists reject (4), but the next section shows why they needn’t do so. Minimally, we can conclude that the cumulative power of Worsley’s Extensive Joy Argument and the Undercutting Argument is sufficiently strong to presume both the possibility and actuality of heavenly procreation.

4. The Practicality of Heavenly Procreation

Having reviewed arguments for the possibility of heavenly procreation and concluded that our best evidence supports the possibility, I shall now defend its practicality for the anti-natalist in combatting the Autonomy Objection. However, I first need to stipulate some background assumptions beginning with:

UNIVERSALISM:

All human persons will, postmortem, eventually enter Heaven and remain there eternally.

Without this, human persons might cease to exist or land someplace bad, like Hell, and neither option presents reasonable opportunities for procreation. Second, I assume

HARMLESS:

Nonconsensual heavenly harm is either impossible or (foreseeably) nonactual.

This allows for the possibility of consensual harm in Heaven, which might be useful for trans women wanting the ‘full experience’ of carrying or birthing a child. Moreover, Harmless is disjunctive: It is compatible with the view that Heaven necessarily lacks nonconsensual harm and the view that, while still possible, are foreseeable nonactual.\(^{23}\)

Recall that the Autonomy Objection troubles anti-natalism *not* because it deprives human persons of *some* procreative opportunities, but because it deprives them of *too many*. How many is too many? There are no established moral principles for this. However, we can safely assume that when most, nearly all, or all of one’s reasonable opportunities are removed, that is too many. And that seems to be precisely the problem with anti-natalism, according to most versions of the Autonomy Objection. It’s here that *heavenly* procreation proves its usefulness. Recall the *Autonomy Argument*:

The Autonomy Argument

1. Persons have a strong *pro tanto* right to procreate.
2. If (1), then procreation is generally permissible.
3. If anti-natalism is true, then procreation is not generally permissible.
4. Therefore, anti-natalism is false.

We can now see that premise (3) is ambiguous. In particular, ‘generally’ is ambiguous. On the one hand, it might mean the following:

3a. If anti-natalism is true, then procreation is not permissible *for the duration of the average human person’s premortem life*.

Let’s assume anti-natalists are, in fact, committed to the truth of (3a). Even so, the average human person’s *premortem* life is mere seconds when compared to their *postmortem* heavenly life. This reveals a second possible interpretation of (3):

3b. If anti-natalism is true, then procreation is not permissible *for the duration of the average human person’s total lifetime (including postmortem)*.

If you endorse UNIVERSALISM and HARMLESS, you should think (3b) is *false*. Indeed, the infinite duration of heavenly life decisively swamps the duration of premortem life. As far as reasonable opportunities for procreation go, then, only a tiny fraction of those opportunities is premortem; the rest are all postmortem. To see the moral relevance of this more clearly, consider the following example:

*Hours.* Fernanda wants to make a baby with her partner, Carlos. Both are 20 years of age. However, Fernanda discovers she recently contracted the Zika virus while on holiday in São Paulo and cannot safely procreate until she receives the new mRNA vaccine. Fortunately, if she’s willing to drive an hour to Brasilia (which she can easily do), she can receive the mRNA vaccine within a few hours and safely procreate with Carlos that same day.

Fernanda and Carlos have two options for procreating today: wait a few hours to get vaccinated or don’t wait a few hours. Pursuing the former will, by stipulation, cause Fernanda’s fetus to develop congenital Zika syndrome, or CZS. The range of symptoms of CZS includes severe microcephaly with a collapsed skull, seizures, brainstem dysfunction, and retinal lesions (Centers for Disease Control 2020). Under all anti-natalist and nearly all pro-natalist views, Fernanda and Carlos should wait a few hours to get vaccinated before
procreating to ensure safe procreation. But waiting doesn’t come without a small burden for them, namely, waiting a few hours. What makes this burden small? Presumably, it’s the fact that Fernanda and Carlos have plenty of time; a few extra hours waiting to make a baby is nothing for them. They are young (both are 20), otherwise healthy, and fertile, and will lose none of those properties soon. Thus, the hours don’t impose a substantive burden contextually—that is, as a percentage of their lifetime opportunities. We can express this as follows as the Time-Burden Principle, or ‘TBP’:

**Time-Burden Principle:**
The extent to which temporal deprivations of opportunities is burdensome is determined by the number of remaining opportunities divided by the number of eliminated opportunities, or $B = \frac{R}{E}$.

For Fernanda and Carlos in the *Hours* case, $B$ is low because $R=[20-25$ fertile years] and $E=[a few hours]$. Let’s say Fernanda and Carlos must wait 12 hours, or half a day. Over 20 fertile years, that’s roughly 0.01% of their procreative opportunities. Thus, Fernanda’s and Carlos’ moral obligation to refrain from procreating for a few hours isn’t substantively burdensome; indeed, it hardly seems burdensome at all given they can safely and permissibly procreate the very same day! Now consider a revised version of the *Hours* case:

*Century*. Fernanda wants to make a baby with her partner, Carlos. Both are 20 years of age. However, Fernanda discovers she recently contracted the Zika virus while on holiday in São Paulo and cannot safely procreate until they reach Heaven, as no treatments or vaccines are available. Neither will die until they’re 100.

All that ‘downtime’ may seem like an eternity, but it isn’t if you accept UNIVERSALISM. Like in the original case with Fernanda and Carlos, we can use TBP to calculate the extent to which their morally required ‘waiting time’ is burdensome in *Century*. We know that both are 20 years of age and will live to 100 years of age, making $E=[80$ years]. Assuming Heaven presents temporally unlimited procreative opportunities, it follows that $R=[\text{infinite time}]$. Thus, $B=[\text{infinite time}]/[80\text{ years}]$, which approximates 0.0%. Thus, Fernanda’s and Carlos’ moral obligation to refrain from procreating for 80 years isn’t substantively burdensome; indeed, it equals only a tiny fraction of their total lifespans, a mere drop in the infinite temporal bucket. This gives the universalist anti-natalist a powerful reply to the Autonomy Objection, which I shall call the *Infinite Opportunities Argument*:

**The Infinite Opportunities Argument**
1. All human persons will have infinite opportunities to procreate in Heaven at no risk to them, their children, or others.
2. The extent to which temporal deprivations of opportunities is burdensome is determined by the number of remaining opportunities divided by the number of eliminated opportunities.
3. If anti-natalism is true, all human persons are morally obligated to refrain from procreating for the duration of their premature lives (i.e., roughly 80 years).

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24 The math isn’t actually this favorable since the average human doesn’t have 80 years of fertility.
4. Therefore, if anti-natalism is true, then all human persons are morally obligated to refrain from procreation for 80/infinite years, or ~0.0% of one's total lifetime.

5. An obligation to refrain from procreation for ~0.0% of one's total lifetime is either not burdensome or minimally burdensome.

6. Therefore, if anti-natalism is true, then all human persons' being morally obligated to refrain from procreation for their premortem lives is either not burdensome or minimally burdensome.

For charity’s sake, the argument grants that 80 years of downtime might be minimally burdensome. However, it’s no more burdensome than a requirement to wait 12 hours when you have only 100 years to live. Thus, pro-natalists must either accept my use of TBP or abandon their claim that procreation can ever be impermissible for any length of time, including in cases like Hours. Furthermore, it’s hard to see any other way to calculate the temporal dimensions of burdensomeness noncomparatively: If we don’t know how much time remains, how can we determine the significance of losing X temporal units? It seems we can’t, and thus our calculations must be comparative. And if they must be comparative, then they must include the full time that remains, not an arbitrary portion of it. Thus, the Autonomy Argument's premise (3) arbitrarily limits the comparative harm by restricting opportunities to premortem opportunities, which even the universalist anti-natalist must concede totals at zero. But this allows the universalist anti-natalist to say that postmortem opportunities infinitely outnumber premortem ones, and thus a premortem ban on procreation fails to be particularly burdensome. Thus, ANU defeats the Autonomy Objection.

5. Conclusion

What should philosophers of religion and theists say about procreation ethics? When, if ever, is intentional procreation morally permissible? Herein, I have defended an answer to each: “much” and “only in Heaven,” respectively.

I built my case in four parts. First, I motivated the issue for philosophers of religion and theists: They should take anti-natalist arguments and the problems of evil and hell seriously, and thus should take anti-natalism seriously. In Section 2, I articulated and offered a prima facie defense of the Autonomy Objection to anti-natalism. According to the objection, the anti-natalist’s blanket ed prohibition on procreation is a severe threat to procreative autonomy, and in particular a moral right against procreative interference. In Section 3, I considered the possibility of heavenly procreation, arguing that three major arguments for its impossibility fail, that at least four arguments for its possibility succeed, and that heavenly procreation is likely possible. Finally, in Section 4, I defended the Time-Burden Principle: the extent to which temporal deprivations of opportunities is burdensome is determined by the number of remaining opportunities divided by the number of eliminated opportunities. As 80 years of premortem life involve only a smidgeon of the opportunities of infinite years of heavenly life, the Time-Burden Principle implies that a moral obligation to forego premortem procreation is not a heavy burden. Thus, if Anti-Natal Universalism is true, then the Autonomy Objection fails.
Finally, recall the upshots of this project. First, if you accept the existence of Hell, the problem of hell and the problem of hell for permissible procreation must be dealt with. Antinatalism allows you to keep Hell while condemning procreation, or (more plausibly, in my view) embrace universalism while condoning (exclusively) heavenly procreation. Second, the deep tension for pro-natalists who endorse the bottom line of arguments from evil can be ameliorated by embracing a contingent form of anti-natalism. Third, there’s a uniquely theistic way of salvaging anti-natalism from the jaws of the Autonomy Objection: an afterlife loaded with procreative opportunities. Thus, anti-natalists should recognize theism as an unlikely bedfellow and consider embracing it. Fourth, the Anti-Natal Universalist can accept a robust version of procreative autonomy whose satisfaction will be—in a word—heavenly.

Works Cited


Conly, Sarah. 2016. One Child: Do We Have a Right to More? (Oxford University Press)


