

HONORABLE SURVIVORS: A FEMINIST REPLY TO STATMAN

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Helen Frowe depicts the following fictional case: Fran is being raped by Eric and can't stop him with violent resistance. Nevertheless, she resists and breaks Eric's wrist. The infliction of defensive harm on Eric is intuitively permissible, yet it runs counter to the dominant view that defensive harms must stand a reasonable chance of success. Call this the Success Condition (S). To solve this problem, Daniel Statman contends that even if Victim's defensive harms fail to prevent her rape, they do prevent the destruction of another good, her *honor*, and thus S is satisfied. Recently, Joseph Bowen has critiqued Statman's proposal by showing that honor-based justifications for defensive harming are too permissive. In this paper, I contend that Statman's proposal is too restrictive. First, I review Statman's accounts of honor, dishonor, and non-honor. Second, I argue that Statman's account requires Fran's honor to be lost or damaged if she doesn't resist—a highly offensive conclusion about rape victims. Third, I explain why the best alternative to this (i.e., allowing Fran's honor to be maintained either way) satisfies S but not the necessity condition. I conclude that we ought to reject Statman's solution.

1. BACKGROUND: HONOR AND SUCCESS

I raised my daughter in the American fashion. I gave her freedom, but I taught her never to dishonor her family. She found a boyfriend, not an Italian. She went to the movies with him. She stayed out late. I didn't protest. Two months ago, he took her for a drive with another boy friend. They made her drink whiskey, and then they tried to take advantage of her. She resisted. She kept her honor. So they beat her like an animal.

—Amerigo Bonasera, *The Godfather* (Coppola 1972)

When Amerigo Bonasera recounts the events of his daughter's rape, he emphasizes that she *resisted* the rape and "kept her honor." The apparent implication is that his daughter's honor was preserved *because* she resisted.

This line of thinking—what we might call the *honor-based justification* of self-defense—is hardly restricted to Sicilian musings in cinema masterpieces. It has been philosophically popularized by Daniel Statman. To appreciate Statman's proposal, however, it is necessary first to explain the problem Statman aims to solve. Statman's target is the so-called *Success Condition* (S) for permissible self-defense, the importance of which he characterizes thusly:

Wars are hell, as Walzer reminds us, even when the conventional rules governing the conduct of war—the rules of *jus in bello*—are observed. When wars achieve their goal, they have some meaning. They are not pointless shedding of blood. When, however, wars fail to achieve their goal, then the cost in human suffering is terrible, with little or no redeeming compensation. The basic idea of S [the Success Condition] is, then, that war should not be waged unless it is likely to succeed, lest many human lives be lost in vain.¹

Separately, Helen Frowe claims the problem is that "a harm must have some chance of averting a threat if it is to count as *defensive*."² So if the aim is to justify defensive harms in war or domestic contexts, those harms must stand some *reasonable* chance of success.³ Statman distinguishes between objective and subjective accounts of the Success Condition, the former requiring actual success and the latter requiring only a reasonable belief of success.⁴

According to Statman, we should reconsider the Success Condition because of cases like the following. I should note this is not Statman's case, but rather my own paraphrasing of a case by Frowe⁵ that mirrors Statman's own case.⁶ Here's the case:

Rape. Eric is in the midst of culpably raping Fran. Eric is much bigger and stronger than Fran, and consequently there is nothing she can do to stop him from continuing to rape her. While being raped, Fran threatens to break Eric's wrist, though this will do nothing to stop the rape from occurring. Fran then breaks his wrist.

Is Fran's breaking of Eric's wrist an instance of justified defensive harm? Not if the Success Condition holds, according to Statman. Commenting on the Warsaw ghetto uprising of April 1943, in which Jews decided to take up arms and resist their deportation to Treblinka, Statman remarks on the Success Condition's implications:

From their point of view, the purpose of the uprising was not to beat the Germans and not even to save their own lives. It was a struggle for "three lines in history," as one of the leaders of the Jewish resistance famously put it. It was not their lives the rebels were fighting for but their honor. They knew that they were almost 100 percent doomed. They wanted to die with a gun in their hands

rather than in Treblinka or another death camp. The shocking upshot of these historical comments is that, according to S, because the Jews of the Ghetto were not fighting for their lives, they were not morally justified in killing the Germans, at least not under the right of self-defense.⁷

That conclusion is indeed startling. We bristle at the very idea that Fran or the Jews in the ghetto uprising acted impermissibly, much less non-defensively. The Success Condition appears to imply otherwise. So the Success Condition is false. But appearances can be deceiving, as Statman himself points out in the course of explaining his favored solution:

It all depends on what counts as success, which, in turn, depends on what the goal of the defensive act is. If, as assumed so far, its goal is to prevent the death or the rape of the victim, then admittedly the goal is unlikely to be achieved; hence, the act cannot be justified in terms of self-defense. But, as already indicated in the case of the Warsaw ghetto uprising, sometimes the goal is not to defend the life (or property or whatever is directly threatened) of the victims but rather their honor.⁸

Why do we care about honor? Because, says Statman, “we realize that in some real sense our worth depends on the judgment of others within that society”:⁹

We realize that, in the eyes of the aggressor, we are just items to be used, mere objects. Given the power of the aggressor and his ability to force his will upon us, we fear that by doing so he will quite literally degrade us. We feel we must protect not only our body or our property but our *selves*. To reaffirm our honor in the face of such threats, we need more than abstract thoughts such as “I’m proud to be who I am, and nobody can diminish my inner sense of worth.” Concrete acts of resistance are needed in order to communicate to the aggressor, to ourselves, and to an actual or potential audience that we are not just passive objects to be trodden upon. By carrying out such acts, we reaffirm, or protect, our honor.¹⁰

Moreover, Statman claims that persons who defend their honor *necessarily* succeed at maintaining it:

Whenever victims of aggression are overwhelmed by an aggressor but, nonetheless, find the courage to rise against him through some form of determined resistance, however hopeless, they are thereby reaffirming their honor, or—to use a rather out-of-date expression—they show themselves to be men (or women) of honor. Hence, such actions necessarily succeed . . . in achieving their goal.¹¹

Thus, they “might be literally trodden upon, but symbolically they are not” because they “reject the dehumanizing message of Aggressor.”¹² Following Statman, call this the *Honor Solution*. If successful, the Honor Solution allows us to substitute the defensive aim for which both Fran and the Warsaw Jews fought: not averting their rape or murders but averting threats to their honor. So a reasonable chance of preserving one’s honor satisfies the Success Condition and creates space for

permissible self-defense. Further, it purportedly satisfies the *Necessity Condition*, which I'll characterize as follows:

Necessity Condition: Necessarily, if S permissibly inflicts harm H on S* to avert S*'s unjust harm H* to S, then S could not have reasonably averted H* by inflicting a lesser harm than H on S*.

Satisfying the necessity condition is widely viewed as a necessary condition for permissible harming. It's not difficult to see why: Unnecessary harms are harms inflicted *without justification*, and harms inflicted without justification are all-things-considered morally impermissible. Thus, the permissibility of defensive action rides not only on whether the harm you inflicted *worked*, but also whether a lesser harm that was reasonably available *would have worked just as well*.

Despite its appeal, Statman's Honor Solution has come under fire. Helen Frowe thinks it promising and modifies it to suit her proportionate-means externalist view of moral liability, but not before identifying worries about honor and proportionality.¹³ Joseph Bowen, adopting an internalist view of moral liability, criticizes the Honor Solution on the grounds that it cannot permit defensive harming and substantial unnecessary harming.¹⁴ I propose a novel objection to the Honor Solution, which I'll express in argument form:

The Honorable Victims Argument

1. Either (a) person S's honor is compatible with not resisting their oppression or (b) S's honor is incompatible with not resisting their oppression. [Assumption]
2. If (a), then the Honor Solution does not satisfy the necessity condition and self-defense remains impermissible. [Assumption]
3. Not (b), as that implies Fran and the Warsaw Jews would lack honor if they declined to resist their oppression. [Assumption]
4. Therefore, the Honor Solution does not satisfy the necessity condition and self-defense remains impermissible. [From (1)–(3)]

Despite being an objection that Statman briefly considers, he rejects it too swiftly.¹⁵ In what follows, I'll defend the *Honorable Victims Argument*. In the next section, I consider Statman's distinction between honor and dignity, as well as recent accounts of honor and its possible loss. I argue, *pace* Statman, that honor cannot be lost by mere nonresistance or by nonviolent resistance and that neither Fran nor the Warsaw Jews would have lacked or lost honor had they acted differently. Indeed, the notion that Fran or the Warsaw Jews would have been *without honor* (or, worse, *dishonorable*) had they not resisted is a conclusion both I and most victims of sexual assault find morally atrocious. Then I show that if maintaining one's honor is compatible with nonresistance (or with nonviolent resistance), the necessity condition remains unsatisfied.

2. TWO VIEWS OF HONOR

A central assumption of Statman's case is that honor *can be lost*. He anticipates the objection that some might prefer "dignity" to "honor" and that dignity cannot be lost. He replies:

However, as I explained elsewhere, this idea of human dignity, supreme and inspiring as it is, seems incompatible with the possibility that human beings might "lose" their dignity, or be "robbed" of it. And, if we cannot lose our dignity, then threats to bring about such a loss are empty and there is no need for protective acts to counter them. Since such doubts about the vulnerability of dignity do not arise in connection with the vulnerability of honor, the latter notion seems to me to capture better the idea behind honor, namely, that Victim's honor is threatened in a real manner and that acts of resistance against Aggressor might help to protect her from this threat.¹⁶

For Statman, efforts to affirm one's honor *necessarily succeed* no matter the outcome with respect to the primary (bodily) threat.¹⁷ But for Statman, not *all* forms of resistance reaffirm or protect one's honor. Mere self-recognition of one's value and honor are insufficient. At one point, he comes close to claiming that nonviolent resistance is insufficient:

It is not the nonviolence itself that would protect a Gandhi from degradation but his prior overcoming of his concern about honor, which made him indifferent to all types of humiliation. In other words, what Gandhi offers us is not an alternative way of reaffirming honor in the cases under discussion but a way of immunizing ourselves so that we won't suffer any offense in the first place.¹⁸

While this is not a rejection of nonviolent resistance as sufficient to reaffirm or protect one's honor, Statman *needs* to reject this possibility.¹⁹ His central cases, *Rape* and the Warsaw revolt, involve not just resistance but *violent* resistance. To vindicate their actors, Fran and the Warsaw Jews, it is necessary that their violent resistance be *the only way* (or, at least, the least harmful way) to reaffirm or protect their honor. That much is affirmed by Joseph Bowen:

If defensive harming is a means of affirming a victim's honor, and argument must be presented as to why *harming* threateners is the only, or the most effective way to achieve this. To put it another way, if there are less harmful ways of defending (or restoring) one's honor, *harming* threateners is not going to satisfy necessity in any case.²⁰

Before continuing, we need to disambiguate Statman's "honor" claims about Fran and the Warsaw Jews. Here are three possibilities:

Honor-as-appraisal: Fran and the Warsaw Jews would *have less honor* if they did not violently resist.²¹

Honor-as-worthiness: Fran and the Warsaw Jews would *be less honorable* if they did not violently resist.²²

Honor-as-recognition: Fran and the Warsaw Jews would be *less honored* if they did not violently resist.²³

Each of these interpretations is well-represented in the literature. The first two share a common focus on moral character, on being good and (in honor-as-appraisal) on being seen as good. The third, by contrast, concerns neither appraisal nor worthiness, but *treatment*, as Stephen Darwall explains:

As with recognition and respect of any kind, we honor someone by how we conduct ourselves toward her, by regulating our conduct in certain ways. It is something we broadly *do*. Honor respect is thus unlike any attitude, like esteem, which we may simply *have* toward a person. . . . It calls for, and may often require, a certain uptake from others.²⁴

For Darwall, honor is distinct from “virtue or merit.”²⁵ The difference between *appraisal* and *worthiness* is normative, with the former being descriptive and the latter normative. The former concerns how people *in fact* evaluate you irrespective of whether their evaluation is accurate or fair. The latter concerns how people *should* evaluate you irrespective of how they do, in fact, evaluate you. For instance, others can *appraise* my writing as meriting a Pulitzer Prize even if I (unbeknownst to them) plagiarized. But if I plagiarized, I can hardly be said to be *worthy* of a Pulitzer Prize.

With these disambiguated interpretations of honor in hand, we can evaluate Statman’s claims about Fran and the Warsaw Jews more clearly. To have your “honor” threatened in the honor-as-appraisal or honor-as-worthiness sense means your moral character or worth is diminished. In short, it’s to say something *bad* about *you* or (with honor-as-appraisal) *how others view you*.²⁶ By contrast, to have your “honor” threatened in the honor-as-recognition sense means you are subjected to *mistreatment*. In short, it’s to say something bad about *how you are treated*.

Call these *Honor Internalism* and *Honor Externalism*, respectively. We now have two different interpretations of the Honor Solution:

Honor Internalism: Fran and the Warsaw Jews would preserve their *honor* (i.e., moral character or reputation) only if they inflicted defensive harm on their oppressors. [Honor-as-appraisal; honor-as-worthiness]

Honor Externalism: Fran and the Warsaw Jews would preserve their *honor* (i.e., proper treatment) only if they inflicted defensive harm on their oppressors. [Honor-as-recognition]

In the next section, I argue that Honor Internalism is false whereas Honor Externalism is irrelevant to the problem that the Honor Solution purports to solve.

3. AGAINST DISHONOR

I’ll offer two arguments against Honor Internalism, the first of which is:

The Normative Shame Argument

1. Persons whose honor is damaged or destroyed ought to feel shame. [Assumption; Honor Internalism]
2. Neither Fran nor the Warsaw Jews ought to have felt shame had they not violently resisted. [Assumption; moral intuition]
3. So neither Fran nor the Warsaw Jews were persons whose honor would have been damaged or destroyed had they not violently resisted. [From (1)–(2)]

The first premise is broadly endorsed. For example, Anthony Cunningham remarks that “shame is the requisite emotional response” to diminished or desecrated honor.²⁷ That’s reasonable: A diminished moral character or reputation merits shame. But it’s very counterintuitive (and morally repugnant) to think that either Fran or the Warsaw Jews *ought* to have felt shame had they acted differently. I take this to be a pivotal feminist commitment: *Sexual assault survivors ought not be shamed*,²⁸ whether for not employing defensive measures, not (quickly) reporting their rape to authorities, or not disclosing their horrific abuse to friends or family. On, then, to the second argument:

The Reduced Respect Argument

1. If one’s honor is damaged or destroyed by nonviolent resistance or non-resistance, then we should (or are, at least, permitted to) view nonviolent and passive rape victims as less worthy of respect. [Assumption; Honor Internalism]
2. We shouldn’t (and are not permitted to) view nonviolent and passive rape victims as less worthy of respect. [Assumption; moral intuition]
3. So it’s not the case that one’s honor is damaged or destroyed by nonviolent resistance or nonresistance. [From (1)–(2)]

Like the prior argument, the first premise enjoys broad support.²⁹ Kwame Anthony Appiah claims that “honor means being entitled to respect.”³⁰ Victor Kumar and Richard Campbell say that “to be honorable is to merit feelings of moral respect,” whereas to be “unworthy of honor” is to be “unworthy of respect.”³¹ However, it is both cruel and pointless to compound the harms to already traumatized rape victims by viewing them as less worthy of respect, particularly after they were horrifically disrespected by their rapist. This reflects another baseline feminist commitment: *Sexual assault survivors ought not be treated with disrespect*,³² whether because they forewent self-defense, did not (quickly) report their rape to authorities, or did not disclose their traumatic experience to family or friends. So Honor Internalism is false.

Shifting our attention to Honor Externalism, recall that the honor externalist embraces a conception of honor as *recognition* or *proper treatment*. That prompts an important question: Recognition and proper treatment *from whom*? There are only three possibilities: from *yourself*, from the *perpetrator*, from *third parties*. Now consider the following argument against Honor Externalism:

The Irrelevance Argument

1. If Fran and the Warsaw Jews could preserve their honor (i.e., proper treatment) exclusively *via* defensive harm, then they could ensure proper treatment by either (a) *themselves*, (b) *their perpetrators*, or (c) *third parties* exclusively *via* defensive harm. [Assumption]
2. Not (c), as third parties neither mistreat nor would look down upon Fran or the Warsaw Jews irrespective of whether they inflicted defensive harm. [Assumption]
3. Not (a), as proper self-treatment remains possible irrespective of whether they inflict defensive harm. Moreover, an inability to self-recognize/self-honor is esoteric and so not widely applicable. [Assumption]
4. Not (b), as perpetrators will not (by stipulation and without resolving the problem the Honor Solution allegedly solves) treat Fran or the Warsaw Jews properly irrespective of whether defensive harm is inflicted upon them. [Assumption]
5. So it's not the case that Fran and the Warsaw Jews could preserve their honor (i.e., proper treatment) exclusively *via* defensive force. [From (1)–(4)]

There are two ways to interpret Premise (2): empirically or normatively. The empirical interpretation invokes a claim about *how real people in fact appraise you*. That is, it invokes honor-as-appraisal. Most of us, I suspect, do not look askance at sexual assault survivors or Holocaust survivors who never violently resisted their oppression. The normative interpretation invokes a claim about *how people should evaluate you*, irrespective of how they do, in fact, evaluate you. That is, it invokes honor-as-worthiness. We should not look askance at survivors, and those who do are irrational or indecent.

Similar possible interpretations hold for the third premise, but I won't explore them. Rather, I shall rely on the following defense: Those who "cannot live with themselves" unless they inflict defensive harm, and so lose honor-recognition in their own eyes, exhibit a rather esoteric inability. In saying this, I mean only that many people *can* view themselves as honorable *even if* they never violently resisted their oppressors. My point, then, isn't to be dismissive of those who *can't* manage this self-evaluation; indeed, I think it's deeply important that persons respect and value themselves. Rather, the point is that the ability to self-recognize

or self-honor varies by person, and thus a sweeping vindication of Honor Externalism on the basis of psychological limitations or differences among persons seems tenuous at best. In other words, the fact that some persons will prove unable to view themselves as honorable unless they violently defend themselves fails to vindicate the honor of those who *are* able to view themselves as honorable even if they forgo violent self-defense, and thus fails to vindicate an enormous swath of victims. So we should reject (a).

A defense of the final premise, Premise (4), is straightforward. Recall that the Honor Solution invokes the secondary good of *preserving honor* while conceding that the primary good of *avoiding physical harm* will be unsuccessful. The motivation for this, again, is the necessity condition: The harm inflicted must be necessary to avert some harm (or secure some good). By fighting back, according to the Honor Solution, Fran preserves her honor if not her physical integrity. Let's suppose, contrary to what Premise (4) actually claims, that Fran's rapist Eric *would* treat her properly if she violently resisted.³³ That entails that Eric would stop raping Fran. But then the primary harm to Fran (i.e., the physical rape) is averted by Fran's defense, and thus the problem the Honor Solution purports to solve is dissipated. So the acceptance of (b) entails the irrelevance of the Honor Solution. So we should reject (b) for this reason. So Premise (4) is true. So we should reject Honor Externalism. Moreover, absent a third interpretation of the Honor Solution, we should reject the Honor Solution.

4. LINGERING QUESTIONS

I have criticized Statman's Honor Solution on the grounds that it fails to satisfy the necessity condition or repugnantly implies that sexual assault survivors who didn't resist their assaults have diminished honor. However, this leaves two important questions unanswered:

Q1: Is self-defensive harming ever *required* to protect/keep one's honor?

Q2: Is harmless resistance ever *insufficient* to protect/keep one's honor?

Until now, I have tried to remain neutral on these questions. But a paper defending the honor of survivors should address them.³⁴ Otherwise, readers might be left wondering whether survivors are vulnerable to diminished honor based on their responses to unjust aggression.

In reply to Q1, my answer is that self-defensive harming can *never* be a necessary condition for the maintenance of one's honor. There are two powerful but incompatible reasons to embrace this conclusion. Despite their incompatibility, their disjunctive truth is extremely plausible. In other words, we should accept *at least one* of these reasons.

First, because self-defensive harming carries a risk of moral or non-moral (e.g., physical) injury, victims cannot be obligated to undertake this risk. This reflects

the dominant view that self-defensive harming is a moral prerogative of persons, and so not obligatory. Some theorists, such as Carol Hay and Candice Delmas, deny this.³⁵ But even Hay concedes limitations to this obligation:

As we all well know, if someone *cannot* do something then it cannot be that she *ought* to do it. And in virtually every case, defending an obligation to resist oppression seems to be tantamount to blaming the victim: if there is an obligation to resist oppression, after all, then it seems that those who fail to resist their oppression will be the appropriate subjects of blame.³⁶

Hay's Kantian solution is to say that as harmless resistance can sometimes be the best route to preserving one's rational capacities, the imperfect duty to resist oppression admits sufficient latitude for harmless resistance to be permissible.³⁷ Whatever we think of Hay's account or the duty to resist, she notably invokes the intuitive *blamelessness* of victims as evidence for her view that the duty to resist oppression is limited. But a similar relation holds between diminished honor and blameworthiness: When your honor is diminished, you are liable for blame or other negative moral emotions. Because survivors *aren't* liable for blame or other negative emotions, it follows that their honor isn't diminished.

The second reason to answer negatively to Q1 is that survivors who forgo self-defensive harming seem *morally excused* for doing so by reason of duress, and moral excuse plausibly mitigates the diminishment of honor. Roughly, someone is morally excused just in case they acted impermissibly but are not liable for blame (or other negative moral emotions) as a result.³⁸ The standard excusing conditions are *duress* and *ignorance*. My contention is that victims of sexual assault (like Fran) and genocide (like the Warsaw Jews) are under extreme duress, that such extreme duress fully mitigates moral responsibility, and that the full mitigation of moral responsibility (a necessary condition for moral liability) entails non-liability for blame, other negative moral emotions, and counter-defensive actions (e.g., by Eric or the Nazis). To see why, consider a commonplace example of moral excuse-by-duress:

Robbery. Teller is managing cash at a bank when Thief enters, presses a gun to Teller's head, and informs Teller that he will kill her unless she hands over all her cash. Teller complies.

Because Teller's actions are *coerced* by Thief, she acts under duress. Suppose now that the bank manager fires Teller for surrendering the cash. This seems unjust, with the locus of the injustice being Teller's lack of moral liability to be fired (or blamed, condemned, etc.). The same holds for Fran and the Warsaw Jews: they act under extreme duress, are thus excused, and are thus nonliable. And because *nonviolent* action under duress is no less excused than *violent* action under duress, it follows that forgoing risky self-defensive harming cannot make one blameworthy and so cannot threaten to diminish one's honor.

In reply to Q2, it seems too strong to say that harmless resistance could *never* threaten one's honor, at least in cases where agents are not fully morally excused.

For instance, Hay imagines cases where victims have *internalized* sexist or racist norms about their low self-worth and thus “do not set worthwhile ends for themselves because they do not think they deserve them.”³⁹ The result, as Hay eloquently explains, is as follows:

Accepting one’s oppression can make oppression appear acceptable, or, even worse, it can make oppression appear not to be oppression at all. And doing this is no better than endorsing oppression: sending the message that it is permissible to treat me in these ways in virtue of my being a woman sends the message that it is permissible to treat others in these ways in virtue of their being women, too.⁴⁰

I remain at least open to the epistemic possibility that such persons bear some responsibility for their oppression and so place their honor at risk. That is, sometimes failing to stand up for yourself may (for all I know) diminish your honor. However, Hay’s judgment that some forms of harmless resistance *necessarily* satisfy the duty to resist oppression is plausible:

In some cases, there might be nothing an oppressed person can do to resist her oppression other than simply *recognizing that something is wrong* with her situation. This is, in a profound sense, better than nothing. It means she has not acquiesced to the innumerable forces that are conspiring to convince her that she is the sort of person who has no right to expect better. It means she recognizes that her lot in life is neither justified nor inevitable.⁴¹

When persons resist in this way, they *avoid internalizing* their own oppression. Where accepting or internalizing your oppression is the sole route to diminished honor, the minimal harmless resistance Hay describes is necessarily sufficient to block the route. Thus, I tentatively conclude that some forms of harmless resistance are *necessarily sufficient* for preserving one’s honor. Therefore, my answer to Q2 is nuanced: While some forms of harmless resistance might result in loss of honor, other forms of harmless resistance necessarily prevent loss of honor.

5. CONCLUSION

Daniel Statman defends *honor* as a justification for the infliction of defensive harm. The core of this justification is that victims who cannot avert the primary threat of physical harm can nevertheless avert the secondary harm of losing their honor. Against this Honor Solution, I defended the following dilemma: Either victims of rape *don’t* violently resist lose their honor as a result (a repugnant conclusion), or they maintain their honor but violate the necessity condition. I leave open the possibility that the latter disjunct is also repugnant, as it implies it’s impermissible for rape victims to inflict defensive harms on their rapists in cases where that will prevent neither the primary nor the secondary harm. My

claims are only that the Honor Solution does not solve this problem and that it introduces a separate moral problem: namely, claiming non-resisting rape victims and Holocaust survivors are without honor.

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NOTES

This essay is dedicated to all survivors of sexual assault and other horrific wrongs whose honor—both character and value—should never go unrecognized or be challenged. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer at this journal for their helpful comments and to Carol Hay for illuminating discussion on the duty to resist.

1. Statman, “On the Success Condition,” 660.
2. Frowe, *Defensive Killing*, 100.
3. Uniacke, “Self-Defense, Just War.”
4. Statman, “On the Success Condition,” 661–62.
5. Frowe, *Defensive Killing*, 99.
6. For the original case, see Quong and Firth (“Necessity, Moral Liability,” 689).
7. Statman, “On the Success Condition,” 665.
8. Statman, “On the Success Condition,” 668.
9. Statman, “On the Success Condition,” 668.
10. Statman, “On the Success Condition,” 668–69.
11. Statman, “On the Success Condition,” 679.
12. Statman, “On the Success Condition,” 680.
13. Frowe, *Defensive Killing*, 109–15. See also Ferzan’s critique of Frowe’s view in Ferzan (“Defending Honor”).
14. Bowen, “Necessity and Liability.”
15. Statman, “On the Success Condition,” 669.
16. Statman, “On the Success Condition,” 669.
17. Statman hedges on this claim later in the paper: “Defensive acts almost necessarily achieve some protection or reaffirmation of Victim’s honor, and they are reasonably regarded as such by Victim” (“On the Success Condition,” 680).
18. Statman, “On the Success Condition,” 680.
19. Cf. Statman (“On the Success Condition,” 686):

I leave open the question of whether it might be morally preferable for her to transcend honor and, in a Gandhi-like approach, refrain from exercising this right. Similarly, and in the opposite direction, I wish to leave open the question

of whether one is under an obligation (of self-respect) to resist attackers on the individual or the collective level. To maintain that Victim has a right to act against Aggressor in self-defense is compatible with a recommendation that she refrain from doing so, as well as with the view that she has an obligation to act in the defense of her honor.

20. Bowen, "Necessity and Liability," 91.
21. Bayefsky, "Dignity, Honor"; Cunningham, *Modern Honor*; French, "Honor, Shame."
22. Appiah, *Honor Code*; Kumar and Campbell, "Honor and Moral Revolution"; Olsthoorn, "Honor as a Motive."
23. Darwall, *Honor, History*.
24. Darwall, *Honor, History*, 17.
25. Darwall, *Honor, History*, 35.
26. Like Statman, I assume persons have a legitimate interest in what others think of them.
27. Cunningham, *Modern Honor*, 69. Cf. Darwall (*Honor, History*, 15–16).
28. McDonald, "Shaming, Blaming."
29. An anonymous reviewer objects that Honor Internalism doesn't hold in the relevant cases because (a) Honor Internalism requires *victims* to be the root cause of their dishonor, and (b) they *aren't* the root cause of their dishonor. But my characterization of Honor Internalism doesn't require (a). All it requires is that others either *misappraise* you (i.e., regard you as lacking honor) or that you be *unworthy* of people's praise. When others unjustly dishonor/mistreat you, they misappraise you and thus deprive you of honor-as-appraisal; however, they don't necessarily thereby render you unworthy of honor, and thus don't deprive you of honor-as-worthiness. The latter point is what's emphasized by the Normative Shame Argument, according to which those unworthy of honor ought to feel shame.
30. Appiah, *Honor Code*, 175.
31. Kumar and Campbell, "Honor and Moral Revolution," 147, 150.
32. Larson, "Survivors, Liars"; Yap, "Credibility Excess."
33. There's some empirical evidence that violent resistance rarely causes further injury to sexual assault victims. For a summary, see Tark and Kleck ("Resisting Rape"). For an older analysis, see Marchbanks, Lui, and Mercy ("Risk of Injury").
34. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to address these questions.
35. Hay, "Obligation to Resist"; Delmas, *Duty to Resist*.
36. Hay, "Obligation to Resist," 29. Delmas also concedes this: "I concede that dangerous courses of action are not morally required" (*Duty to Resist*, 133), and "the fair-play duty to resist cannot demand sacrificing one's life or exposing other people to significant risks" (*Duty to Resist*, 134).
37. Hay, "Obligation to Resist," 36.

38. This second reason is logically inconsistent with the first, as self-defensive actions cannot be *both* permissible and impermissible (but blameless). However, as I mentioned at the outset, the likelihood that survivors *either* acted permissibly *or* acted excusably is very high, given their intuitive blamelessness.

39. Hay, "Obligation to Resist," 26.

40. Hay, "Obligation to Resist," 22.

41. Hay, "Obligation to Resist," 32. Later in the paper, Hay raises the possibility that internal resistance of this sort risks *self-deception*. That is, persons might mistakenly believe they are resisting when, in fact, they have merely internalized their oppression ("Obligation to Resist," 33–34). However, Hay is clear that *real* or *de facto* internal resistance is necessarily sufficient ("Obligation to Resist," 34).

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